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Nuclear Reform Monitoring Committee

Criteria for the Goals and Objectives of Nuclear Safety Reform

At the end of this fiscal year, the nuclear safety reform of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. (TEPCO) will mark the three-year milestone since the comprehensive review of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident and the establishment of the Nuclear Safety Reform Plan (hereinafter referred to as "Reform Plan"). At the 10th meeting of the Nuclear Reform Monitoring Committee (hereinafter referred to as "Committee") held on November 20, 2015, the Committee was given a report from TEPCO about a plan for self-assessment, re-specifying the guidelines designed to achieve the objectives established by the Reform Plan.

With this document, the Committee is establishing eight criteria for conducting the self-assessment from the viewpoint of continuous promotion of improvement in management, and establishment of a nuclear safety culture. The Committee will examine the current state of nuclear safety while urging further improvement based on the activities carried out over the 3 years of nuclear safety reform..

The criteria have been established with the expectation that TEPCO shall aim for even higher levels of safety, based upon the "goals to be achieved" of the Reform Plan and building upon the reforms implemented to date. The Committee will continuously monitor TEPCO's progress in light of the following criteria.

1. ***Management should lead the way in "prioritizing nuclear safety," and each and every employee should constantly question the level of safety with the aim of raising its standard.***

   TEPCO's approach, prior to the accident, should be changed. Then nuclear safety was assumed to have been fully established and priority was given to business issues such as improving the availability ratio. With sincere reflection on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, the management needs to place nuclear safety as the paramount business challenge, making sure that all employees are aware of safety and work on continuous improvement.

2. Governance of the Nuclear Power Division should be enhanced.

There must be improvements for overall nuclear risk management, which was not sufficient for a company that deals with the unique risks associated with nuclear power. The roles, responsibilities, and authority of each department need to be clearly defined, and a framework of checks and follow-ups needs to be put in place as well as the compliance with the basic rules of nuclear safety.

3. On-site nuclear risks should be consistently managed.

Actions should be taken to prevent complacency about compliance with regulations and guidelines, and to reinforce the conviction that further improvement in nuclear safety is always necessary. The latest knowledge needs to be pro-actively obtained. Nuclear safety needs should be reassessed based on site-specific conditions and management capacity so that on-site nuclear risks are clearly understood and necessary countermeasures are promptly implemented.

4. Lessons should be continuously learned from incidents and problems both within and outside the company concerning nuclear safety, and these lessons should be pro-actively incorporated into the organization.

The passive approach prior to the accident should be changed to taking appropriate action to incorporate information and operating experience (OE) from domestic and overseas power stations and other nuclear facilities. Nuclear safety needs to be continuously enhanced to achieve international excellence through the following activities: analyzing the root cause of on-site incidents, applying measures to prevent the occurrence of similar incidents, analyzing the OE from the failures and successes of other companies and examining the countermeasures required at TEPCO. Those actions should be proactively communicated to the domestic and international stakeholders.

5. In-house technical self-sufficiency should be maintained.

There must be a reversal of the decline of in-house technical skills, which was caused by increased dependency on outside technology vendors. The technical dependence on external sources needs to be appropriately optimized. The on-site situation needs to be understood properly not only for emergency response but also for the operations and maintenance in normal conditions. The knowledge, expertise, and skills demanded of in-house personnel need to be clearly defined and maintained, and human resources need to be obtained in a structured manner to satisfy these requirements.

6. Emergency response capability should be constantly improved in order to be able to handle all types of accidents.

Actions should be taken to ensure the improvement in emergency response training that was insufficient before the accident. This includes the need for a clear chain-of-command response. Advance preparations need to be made for personnel, facilities, operating procedures, and a clear chain of command to satisfy emergency response requirements. Effectiveness needs to be improved through repeated, systematic and practical training with clear objectives, assuming various hazard conditions.

7. The opinions of others should be considered. Risks and information should be pro-actively disclosed and dialogue promoted so as to build social trust.

There must be fundamental changes in the passive approach to disclosure of information. During the accident, a gap existed between the company's criteria for information disclosure and what was expected by the general public. Efforts need to be made to disclose risks and information promptly and appropriately in a straightforward and understandable manner to address the needs of the general public and the technical community. There needs to be continuous interaction with all stakeholders.

8. Exposure doses should be managed and reduced as much as reasonable.

There must be continuous improvement in working conditions, which became an important issue in the process of reactor decommissioning and contaminated water management at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. The work that involves a high risk of exposure should be identified and the number of workers and employees should be optimized. The radiation exposure limits for departments and individuals need to be set, assessed, and managed to be as low as reasonably achievable, and in accordance with international standards.

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