

**Report on the Investigation and Examination into the Fukushima Daiichi NPS
Drainage K Information Disclosure Issue (Summary)**

I. Background, composition and activities of the Information Disclosure Subcommittee

(1) Date of Establishment: March 6, 2015

(2) Members of the Subcommittee:

[Chairman] Mr. Masafumi Sakurai

[Members] [Legal Counsels]

Shiro Shida, Akihiko Shiba, Hisatoshi Fujito, Keisuke Kaneko

[Technical Expert]

Akira Fujita (JGC Corporation)

[Communication Expert]

Hiroko Kondo (Accenture Japan, Ltd.)

(3) Investigation:

- Review of TEPCO internal investigation reports
- Interview with related parties (approximately 29 hours with 14 interviews)
- Site visit to Fukushima Daiichi NPS (two times)

II. Investigation and review results by the Subcommittee

1. Introduction

- The issue in question was the failure to timely disclose measurement data (hereinafter referred to as, “The Data”) that was collected from the waste water in drainage K at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS.
- In the wake of the leakage of tritium into the port in 2013, TEPCO adopted a new policy (hereinafter referred to as, “2013 Disclosure Policy”) stating that it would promptly disclose data obtained from the measurement as well as disclose information about the plan of data measurement.
- This failure to disclose drainage K measurement data is a violation of the 2013 Disclosure Policy, which was a self-disciplinary rule and social commitment. It was this violation that laid at the very heart of the issue.

2. Facts and background

- Some of related executives and officials were informed of the fragments of The Data. However, none of them did not give significant deliberation to whether or not The Data should be disclosed, until The Data was later disclosed in February 2015 after it was discovered that a high dose contamination source existed on top of the Unit 2 R/B.

3. Cause analysis and the further considerations

- There were largely two reasons why these executives and officials had not been able to change their mindset that violated the 2013 Disclosure Policy and was not in line with public expectation regarding information disclosure. These reasons were: (1) organizational issues that prevented the 2013 Disclosure Policy from being appropriately implemented, and (2) the spirit to satisfy the expectation of general public concerning information disclosure had not permeated throughout the company.

(1) Organizational issues that prevented the 2013 Disclosure Policy from being appropriately implemented

- ✓ The Related Executives lacked awareness that the 2013 Disclosure Policy was the published social commitment and it was an effort to restore public trust. As a result they did not engage in efforts to fully disseminate and permeate the sense of ownership throughout the company.
- ✓ Related departments did not systematically or comprehensively examine the responsibility, concrete process and assignment for the implementation of the 2013 Disclosure Policy.
- ✓ Related Executives were not clearly aware of roles and responsibilities of their own as well as the roles and responsibilities of their departments in the implementation of the 2013 Disclosure Policy. Also, there was no common perception formed in regards to the responsibility for implementation of the policy, cross checks and assignment.
- ✓ As a reason for points stated above, there is a corporate climate to avoid defining responsibility for the implementation of the plan. And it might greatly hinder TEPCO's efforts to regain public trust if left untouched.

(2) The spirit to satisfy the expectation of general public concerning information disclosure was not permeated through the company.

- ✓ The spirit of information disclosure by accurately assessing the constantly changing concerns of society had not sufficiently permeated throughout the

company.

- ✓ The Social Communication Office (SC Office) and risk communicators (RCs) had continuously strived to permeate the spirit to satisfy the expectation of general public concerning information disclosure to the Nuclear Power Division. However, there was a discrepancy between the Nuclear Power Division and the SC Office in the perception of their functions, thereby fostering a tendency in some parts of the Nuclear Power Division to leave responsibility of information disclosure to the SC Office and RCs without making the own decision from the social perspective.

III. Assessment of TEPCO's management of the issue

- In response to the issue, on March 30, 2015, TEPCO published the “New Mechanism and Organizational Approach to Information Disclosure”. The mechanism called for (1) the disclosure of all radiation data measured at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS, (2) the disclosure of data widely on websites and holding press conferences to explain the issues of particular concerns of the society, and (3) the periodic monitoring and assessment of the rules for data disclosure and performance by external parties.
- These efforts for (1) and (2) steadily continued to this day and the Subcommittee confirmed that TEPCO has been appropriately disclosing radiation data.
- As for (3), TEPCO continually reported its efforts for (1) and (2) to various external organizations and the Nuclear Reform Monitoring Committee was periodically reported of those results. The Nuclear Reform Monitoring Committee would designate an “assessment team” if necessary and would deliver an observation on the disclosure of the data.

IV. Conclusion

- The efforts and perseverance of these individuals in the company were not, however, organically integrated within TEPCO, thereby preventing the organization from sufficiently functioning.
- In particular, it is necessary for TEPCO to seriously reflect on the establishment of a process to implement the plans, the clarification of responsibility in implementation, follow-ups, the importance of social commitments and further permeation of the spirit to satisfy the expectation of general public concerning information disclosure and make further improvements.