

Outline of “Nuclear Safety Reform Plan Progress Report (FY2013 2nd Quarter)”

November 1, 2013

Tokyo Electric Power Company

Progress on Nuclear Safety Reform Plan (Facility Reform)

- Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station:
 - Problems have arisen in which contaminated water flowed into the port and contaminated water leaked from tanks. We are taking these problems very seriously, addressing them as urgent management issues of the highest priority, and we are working on countermeasures.
 - TEPCO established the Contaminated Water and Tank Countermeasures Headquarters to bolster the framework for addressing these issues. The Headquarters is tackling the resolution of these issues in a lateral manner across the organization.
- Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station:
 - Training is being conducted to acquire practical skills through direct management of engineering work, so that even during an emergency, TEPCO employees are able to promptly and securely maintain cold shutdown of a reactor.
- Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station:
 - In addition to the facility measures, measures have also been implemented to address operational issues where accident response was not able to be executed sufficiently.

Progress on Nuclear Safety Reform Plan (Management Reform)

We are working to implement the following countermeasures.

- Countermeasure 1 Reform of Top Management
 - For nuclear power leaders, simulator training was conducted, and power station walk-downs were also held.
- Countermeasure 2 Oversight and Support for Top Management
 - The Nuclear Safety Oversight Office began monitoring activities for improving safety in the Nuclear Power Division.
- Countermeasure 3 Strengthening Ability to Improve Defense in Depth
 - Strengthening of technical proposal abilities through the “Safety Improvement Competition.”
 - The Head Office reviewed information about operating experiences both inside and outside Japan, then conducted analyses and assessments of the impact on facilities for eight of these, and directed power stations to adopt countermeasures.
- Countermeasure 4 Enhancement of Risk Communication
 - Clarification of the roles that risk communicators perform during emergencies.
 - Risk communicators held briefings at foreign embassies in Japan about the flow of contaminated water into the port.

- Countermeasure 5 Reform of Emergency Response Team in Stations and Head Office
 - Standards have been developed for the emergency response organizations at Fukushima Daiichi NPS and Fukushima Daini NPS to transition to a framework based on the Incident Command System¹ (ICS), just as was done at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS and the Head Office, and operations are now due to commence.
- Countermeasure 6 Reform of Station Organization and Enhancement of In-house Maintenance
 - With regard to reassessment of the non-emergency power station organizations at Fukushima Daini and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Stations, transition to the new organizational framework started on September 1.

Status of Investigations into Unidentified and Unexplained Matters in the Fukushima Nuclear Accident

- We have continued to further analyze and reassess existing records, data and other evidence as well as conduct field investigations, with the aim of resolving any unidentified and unexplained matters from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident.

Ends

¹ Incident Command System (system for issuing field commands during a disaster and has been adopted as the standard in the U.S. and elsewhere)