SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS
22nd NUCLEAR REFORM MONITORING COMMITTEE MEETING

1. **Time/Date:** 1 PM~3 PM, Tuesday, May 27, 2025
2. **Place:** 10th floor conference room, main building, Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc.
3. **Attendees:**

Chairman Klein
NRMC Member Mr. Masafumi Sakurai
NRMC Member Dr. Mariko Nishizawa
NRMC Member Dr. Charles Casto
NRMC Member Mr. Yoshimitsu Kobayashi
NRMC Member Mr. Shoichiro Onishi
Secretary General Shiro Arai
Nuclear Reform Special Task Force Director Tomoaki Kobayakawa (TEPCO Executive President)
Nuclear Reform Special Task Force Secretary General Toshihiko Fukuda (Executive Vice President)
Executive Vice President Akira Ono
Managing Executive Officer Masayuki Kishino,
Managing Executive Officer Takeyuki Inagaki (Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS Site Superintendent)

(Observers) Yutaka Kikukawa (Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS Unit Superintendent)
Yutaka Furuhama (Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS Nuclear Safety Center Superintendent)

4. **Summary**

◆ **Greetings from the chairman and remarks by each member**

Chairman Klein

It's good to see everyone. Dr. Casto and I went to 1F, 2F, and we also saw the robotics center by JAEA and also KK. These trips are very helpful for us to visually see the physical condition of the plant and to talk to the people about their performance. At 1F, there's a continued safe release of the tritiated water. At 2F, the plants continue to be in

safe shut down operation. And, KK Unit 6 is now looking like an operating plant rather than a plant under construction. The NMRC has spent a lot of time looking at KK Unit 7. We have looked at the three aspects of people, the plant, and procedures and we have been impressed by the safety improvements that have been added after the 1F accident as well as the training that has occurred at 1F, 2F and KK.

My personal evaluation is that KK Unit 7 is ready to start. However, I always like to give some cautionary notes [to President Kobayakawa]. You can never become complacent. Safety is a journey, not a destination.

You should also expect that things will never be perfect at both KK and 1F. What is important is how TEPCO responds to those unexpected events. So, you need to continue to perform at a high level so that you can gain people's trust and their confidence. You also need to communicate when things go well and when they not go well.

Mr. Sakurai

Overall, all the tasks that need to be carried out at each power station are being done so steadily while prioritizing safety, and initiatives are underway to address various problems and issues.

Last year, I had an opinion exchange with GMTL and after that I exchanged opinions with upper management following the last NRMC meeting. Through these opinion exchanges I was able to confirm that safety culture awareness has spread through each department and its leadership, and that their awareness of problems/issues is the same as mine.

In light of the leak from the high temperature incinerator (HTI) building that occurred at Fukushima Daiichi, I had the opportunity to go inside the HTI building and was reminded of just how difficult and nerve-racking it can be to work in a high-dose environment.

Since many of these troubles were caused by human error, I think it's important to address human error. I commend each power station for their efforts to reduce human errors, and I think it's important that they continue to promote such initiatives.

Furthermore, the troubles and human errors that have occurred over recent years have been directly caused by contractors, and in many cases at times when TEPCO employees were not overseeing the task at hand. Having a plan in place that lays out everything from

what needs to be done to how it is executed is important to prevent human error and it is also effective to have TEPCO employees and contractors work together on a daily basis with a sense of unity. Each power station is taking proactive action to achieve this and I know that various initiatives have been implemented, such as the "one team" approach and efforts to strengthen internal communication, including communication with contractors, so I hope that these initiatives will be even more effective.

In closing, let me reiterate the importance of figuring out how to continually execute rules upon understanding what the rules are for and why they are necessary.

Dr. Nishizawa

Just like you need to respond to unexpected events and equipment, you need to do the same with communication.

If you don't practice communication on a daily basis, it's difficult to get someone to trust you by just saying "trust me" when something happens. That's why it's important to think about how you are engaging with community members in times of normalcy.

Right now, there is a large IAEA stakeholders meeting underway. This shows that in the field of nuclear power, the importance of how to communicate with stakeholders is growing on a global scale. Since people overseas have interest in the Fukushima Daiichi accident, it's important to provide more information to the international community and further improve dialogue.

In closing let me just say that the Fukushima Daiichi accident is something that happened 14 years ago, and we have to think together about how to pass down this experience to younger generations.

Dr. Casto

This is my first meeting, and I want to thank you for the support. The transparency of TEPCO has been very strong with materials and tours of facilities. And, as Dr. Klein talked about, we had takeaways, impressions from all three stations. For me, I think the commonality among all three stations was the strong evidence of one team.

All three of our colleagues here have talked about events plant events or human performance events. The nearer you get to high levels of excellence, you more important even the smallest deviations become, and I think we saw evidence of that at Kashiwazaki

Kariwa with the satellite phone issue.

As a former regulator and a former reactor operator, both Kashiwazaki 6 and 7 plants are continuing to approach operational readiness.

The biggest challenges, as Mr. Sakurai said, is in the safety culture and the people. We see your progress to continue to focus on raising excellent standards.

Mr. Onishi

In addition to being a member of the NRMC, I'm also an external director and I have watched the nuclear power business from both points of view for approximately a year. Overall, as you have reported, the discharge of ALPS-treated water from Fukushima Daiichi is progressing without any hitches, fuel debris retrieval has begun, restart preparations for KK Unit 7 have been completed and preparations for Unit 6 are almost finished. Progress has been made over this year.

There have been some troubles during this period, but it's wonderful to see that contractors and TEPCO are working as "one team" to address these issues as a single entity.

I think, however, it's important to be aware that the objective of forming "one team" is to minimize mistakes and troubles, because completely eliminating them is impossible, and quickly addressing any issues to minimize damage if something occurs. "One team" is a means to achieving this objective and not the objective itself. In order to achieve this objective, it is important that all members, including contractors, truly understand rules and risks, and for this, complicated rules need to be dissected and everyone must make ceaseless efforts to understand them.

Everyone, including contractors, must continue to do their best to make these initiatives sustainable as people come and go over the passage of time.

Mr. Kobayashi

I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the Nuclear Reform Monitoring Committee for their continued guidance. We have made steady progress with both decommissioning and our nuclear power business since the last NRMC meeting.

In regards to decommissioning, we've taken the first step towards the full-scale retrieval of field debris from Fukushima Daiichi with the commencement of the trial

retrieval of field debris from Unit 2. And, the ocean discharge of ALPS-treated water has continued as planned as well as initiatives to combat reputational damage stemming from said discharge. In regards to nuclear power initiatives, we have completed technical preparations for the restart of KK Unit 7, and are currently making preparations for the restart of Unit 6.

However, amidst this progress, we've also experienced troubles that have caused great concern amongst the regional communities and society as a whole, as well as a loss of trust, which we mustn't take lightly.

The foundation of the various activities of the TEPCO Group is trust. I feel that it is important to continue these steady initiatives in order to gain the trust of the regional communities and as Chairman of the Board of Directors I will continue to give my all to implement nuclear reforms with my fellow colleagues so as to gain the trust of the regional communities and society.

◆ Greeting from the Nuclear Reform Special Task Force Director

Nuclear Reform Special Task Force Director Kobayakawa

I would like to express my gratitude to the NRMC for their continued guidance. I would also like to once again express my gratitude to Dr. Casto, who joined the committee in April of last year, for demonstrating his technical expertise in the course of providing guidance to TEPCO.

14 years have already passed since the Fukushima Daiichi Accident and I would like to reiterate that the origins of TEPCO are in the regrets and lessons learned from the accident, and that TEPCO's greatest mission is the fulfillment of our responsibilities to Fukushima.

I would like to update you on the progress that has been made since the last NRMC meeting (February 2024).

Firstly, in regards to the decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi, we successfully completed the trial retrieval of fuel debris from Unit 2 in November of last year and have transitioned to Phase 3 of the Mid/Long-Term Roadmap. A second fuel debris retrieval attempt was completed successfully in April of this year. In regards to ALPS-treated water, discharge began in August 2023, and as of April we have completed a total of 12 discharges. No abnormalities have been detected through ocean monitoring and we will

continue with this task with the utmost sense of responsibility until it is completed so as to ensure that all those in the fishing industry can continue to engage in their livelihood with peace of mind.

Next, in April of last year we completed the fuel charging of KK Unit 7, and completed technical preparations for restart in June. Also, in February of this year we received safety regulation authorization from the Nuclear Regulation Authority for Unit 6, and have completed all inspections required for restart. We expect to complete preparations for restart this summer.

On May 12 of this year, we submitted to the Nuclear Regulation Authority a report on corrective action that has been taken to address the four limiting condition for operation (LCO) deviations that occurred with satellite phone communication systems at KK Unit 7 during the past year, and last week we conducted additional inspections. We will continue to carefully address this matter.

The worker injuries and human errors that occurred at Fukushima Daiichi and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa has caused a loss of trust from people in the region. This is something we must improve.

When I visited Fukushima Prefecture Governor Uchibori at the beginning of the new year, he said that again this year he would like us to carry out decommissioning safely, smoothly, and steadily one day at a time while remembering the desires of the community residents and people of Fukushima, and keeping the people of Fukushima and local residents that are returning home in mind.

During the last meeting, Chairman Klein pointed out that there are problems with the behavior of workers, including workers at power stations. In order to work safely, it is vital that those in the field transcend their positions and build relationships of cooperation and trust, which is why we are promoting our "one team" initiative.

Lastly, in the wake of the Noto Peninsula Earthquake that occurred last year, regional residents have expressed their concern about evacuation in the event of a compound disaster. In order to alleviate these concerns, we are carefully explaining to regional residents that we are implementing various types of safety measures and conducting training using severe accident scenarios based on the lessons we learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, and we are also putting great effort into assistance for improving regional preparedness. Today, I would like to focus on of these initiatives. I

look forward to hearing your frank opinions and guidance.

◆ **Safety minute**

Managing Executive Officer Kishino

I would like to talk about something that happened in my personal life. My daughter is on a professional cheerleading team and when practicing jumps the other day she landed wrong and injured a ligament. Two days later I saw my sister and I told her about the incident, and we both talked about the need to be careful [in life], but immediately after that my sister slipped when getting into her car and compound fractured her ankle in three places. Since this happened immediately after hearing about my daughter, my sister was in quite a shock.

In addition to being in the Nuclear Safety Oversight Office, I am also the Chief Risk Officer and as such I analyze risks for the entire Group. When I look at the improper conduct and accidents that have happened throughout the entire TEPCO Group, it concerns me because there is a tendency for these incidents to occur not during the actual task, but rather during preparations, cleanup, and security-related activities.

When I look back at this, I see a similarity between what happened to my daughter and my sister, and the accidents that are happening at the company; the underlying cause is the same. In other words, [these incidents] are not happening during difficult tasks. When you engage in daily tasks for which there are no clear rules or procedures, and for which most people take for granted, or feel like there could be no problem with doing, then even if you tell them in advance to be careful, they instinctively minimize the risk or convince themselves that there are no risks. I believe this is the underlying cause of all of these incidents and that we need to implement preventive measures upon realizing this.

These two incidents that occurred in my personal life made me realize the necessity for engaging in our duties while always thinking about safety in addition to building mechanisms that enable our colleagues to complete their tasks safely and precisely while also understanding that there are risks in any situation, and that rules and mechanisms can never prevent the manifestation of some risks.

◆ **Nuclear safety reform initiatives**

Nuclear Form Special Task Force Secretary General Fukuda give report using Document 1. The Status of Nuclear Safety Reform Initiatives

Dr. Klein

I would like to comment on your congestion practices. We noticed there was a significant improvement as we entered KK on Tuesday. It was definitely easier to get into the plant. I think that will make your workers feel better about not having to wait so long to get into the plant. That's another example of paying attention to your workers.

Mr. Sakurai

I can see that you have implemented various measures. As I always say, it's important to continue these initiatives. A momentary lack of focus can bring you back to square one. Always remain vigilant is easy to say, but difficult to do, so you need to be innovative in the implementation of your initiatives.

Dr. Casto

I thought that entrance procedure now was creative and innovative. But also, you mentioned in your presentation about the reduction of false alarms. I think that was very impressive. That was a big problem for a long time. So, it's great to see that you greatly reduced that problem through benchmarking, innovation and creativeness.

Mr. Kobayashi

You were having a lot of false alarms when I visited Kashiwazaki Kariwa in November 3 years ago. I'm very impressed at the fantastic job you've done in the last three years and at how innovative you've been. I'd like you to strive to make further reductions.

Dr. Nishizawa

I've been to several regional briefings in Niigata Prefecture and about 70% to 80% of the questions from regional residents were about responding to an earthquake in Kashiwazaki-Kariwa on par with the Noto Peninsula Earthquake or the Fukushima Daiichi Accident.

There are two things that concern me about evacuation.

The first is the fact that the people in the region don't fully understand what it means to shelter-in-place. When something happens, people want to run away from it, so even if you tell them that their exposure would be less if they stayed indoors, the human condition still makes them want to run away. I know that Kashiwazaki-Kariwa facilities will be open to the public if needed to shelter-in-place, and that these facilities are substantially shielded, but if you don't implement some type of education [on these facts], I don't think a lot of people would take advantage of these facilities.

The second thing is risk. People want to keep their exposure to radioactive substances at zero, but keeping risk at zero is impossible. Lowering risk, however, is possible. If you try to convey something in the middle of an emergency, you won't get through. That's why you need to focus on how to convey realistic situations with the people that live in the vicinity of Kashiwazaki Kariwa during times of normalcy.

Nuclear Reform Special Task Force Secretary General Fukuda

We envision opening TEPCO facilities, like Service Hall, etc., in the event of a general disaster. The Noto Peninsula Earthquake caused a tsunami, and, for example, Service Hall is located on high ground, so this is the type of facility that we would like people to evacuate to. The facilities that are under construction will be equipped with showers and drinking water, so we're examining how to use them as temporary evacuation centers in the event of a general disaster.

Since the evacuation plan is being formulated by the national government, TEPCO can leverage its experience with the Fukushima Daiichi Accident and the lessons we learned to explain to the government how to formulate safety measures to combat earthquake and tsunami. Additionally, we now have facilities in place that can postpone venting for approximately 10 days even if we experience a severe accident on par with the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, which will provide sufficient time for an evacuation. So, we are leveraging communication booths, etc., to explain to the people that the evacuations would be calm and orderly.

Also, as you pointed out, you cannot reduce risks to zero, so in addition to explaining how accidents would be handled, we also explain what we are doing to reduce risks. And, it's important to get as many people as possible to participate in emergency evacuation

training so that they understand evacuation procedures.

Dr. Nishizawa

Opening TEPCO facilities to the public in the event of a general disaster, such as a flood, etc., is a very good thing, and by doing so I'm sure that you will implement training to make it possible.

During the Fukushima Daiichi Accident iodine tablets were distributed, but there were people who didn't know how to take them and therefore people who didn't. Will you be explaining such things that regional residents should know?

Nuclear Reform Special Task Force Secretary General Fukuda

The distribution of iodine tablets is carried out by the Prefecture and local governments, and it's my understanding that the local government explains how to take them. We are prepared to answer questions about iodine tablets if they are posed to us at communication booths, etc.

Mr. Onishi

Could you tell me why the number of worker accidents increased during FY2022 and FY2023? And also, in regards to your "one team" initiative, there are a lot of people working at Kashiwazaki Kariwa, so are you, for example, performing stress checks and health checkups for not just TEPCO employees, but also contractors? I'm asking because I feel like evaluating the stress and health of contractors would be necessary for TEPCO if it really seeks to create "one team."

Nuclear Reform Special Task Force Secretary General Fukuda

In regards to the increase in the number of worker accidents, I believe the largest cause is the overall increase in workload caused by large construction, such as specialized safety facility installation, etc., and the overall increase in the amount of work preparations and the expansion of the worksite. Most of these accidents have not occurred during the actual task itself, but rather during preparations or clean up, etc.

In regards to checking the health of non-TEPCO employees, this is something that is basically handled by the contracting company. Heatstroke is a great concern during this

time of year, so since April we have utilized various means to convey rules pertaining to heatstroke and have made sure to let contractors know that workers should rest if they do not feel well.

Unit Site Superintendent Kikukawa (Kashiwazaki Kariwa NPS)

If I may add, out of the 14 worker accidents that occurred last fiscal year more than half occurred during preparations or clean up. In addition to interviewing the injured parties about their stress level and physical health, we have gone to the scene of the accidents to discuss the effectiveness of countermeasures while directly inspecting the actual conditions at the site. By coordinating with contractors and discussing these issues with not only the company involved in the accident, but also other companies that perform similar tasks, we aim to create a sense of unity within the power station and build safety culture and a safe environment.

Mr. Onishi

You said that the cause of the increase in worker accidents was the increase in number of workers in conjunction with the increase in the total workload caused by an increase in specialized safety facility construction, but how does this correlate to the majority of accidents being caused during preparations and cleanup?

Unit Site Superintendent Kikukawa (Kashiwazaki Kariwa NPS)

The scope of specialized safety facility construction has expanded, and that has caused an increase in the number of workers involved in construction, so the total increase in workload is the cause. We are holding informal discussions on effective countermeasures in light of the fact that a lot of these accidents are happening during preparations or cleanup for which procedures are difficult to formulate.

Mr. Onishi

Are preparations and cleanup a new thing? Are these accidents happening because these are preparations and cleanup for new tasks for which methods have not been formulated?

Unit Site Superintendent Kikukawa (Kashiwazaki Kariwa NPS)

For example, when disassembling scaffolding the scaffolding is disassembled and brought outside. So, in the procedures, it merely says to “disassemble the scaffolding and bring it outside.” Through the process of trial and error we are currently formulating countermeasures to prevent accidents from happening during these types of tasks.

Nuclear Reform Special Task Force Secretary General Fukuda

The increase in the number of worker accidents is being caused by the increase in the total workload in conjunction with specialized safety facility installation and Unit 6 safety measure renovations, etc., and many of the accidents are occurring during tasks for which there are no procedures, such as preparations and clean. It's a combination of these two factors that has caused an increase in [work accidents].

Dr. Casto

I would like to give two examples where communications is key. During the Three Mile Island accident, Governor Thornberg decided that evacuation was not possible because of some poor planning on evacuation. Meanwhile, the public was not provided options other than “evacuation is not going to be an option.” Similarly, in 2005 in Hungary, the Paks Plant released iodine, and the same situation happened. They didn't provide the public with any options at all. It's important to give people options, particularly during evacuations.

Chairman Klein

When you look at the Noto earthquake, do you do a post-review of your communication and ask yourselves what do you wish you would have done?

Nuclear Reform Special Task Force Secretary General Fukuda

During the Noto Peninsula Earthquake, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa experienced quite a bit of shaking, but the plant was not affected at all and shut down safely.

Looking back, we found that the transformers at the Shiga NPS were affected, but the details of the incident were not actually conveyed to the public, which was a source of regret. ATENA Set up a working group to reflect upon the Note Peninsular Earthquake

and all power companies are looking at the regrets and deliberating necessary measures. The details can be found on ATENA's website.

Chairman Klein

I do believe you missed an opportunity to educate the people in the KK area from that earthquake. For example, I think if you would have done a timeline, and if you would have said, if both six and seven would have been running at full power, here's what would have happened at KK. You could have gone through a timeline and given your residents of KK confidence that if that had that happened at KK, there would not have been an issue.

Nuclear Reform Special Task Force Director Kobayakawa

That's a very good point. After the Noto Peninsula Earthquake, local residents told us that they wanted an explanation of Kashiwazaki Kariwa safety measures, but we know now that TEPCO didn't explain itself in a manner sufficient to promote understanding amongst them. I feel that the largest problem was that we were not able to convey to regional residents that safety has been improved. We are currently using communication booths to address the concerns of regional residents.

Mr. Kobayashi

Field management requires a lot of paperwork, which limits the amount of time that employees, such as TEPCO managers, can go into the field. So, it's my understanding that work processes are being streamlined to provide more time to go into the field. Could you give me an update on these initiatives?

Nuclear Safety Center Superintendent Furuhama (Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS)

In order to create time to go into the field we're working to eliminate or reduce low-value work, but since all of this work is not necessarily standardized, it has taken time to ascertain field conditions and things are going as smoothly as planned.

However, the Site Superintendent has made the decision to do away with some applications that are merely formality, so I think it's safe to say that things will steadily get better and that we're still in the process of [making improvements.]

Executive Vice President Ono give report using Document 2. Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Decommissioning Initiatives

Chairman Klein

It's very encouraging that the ALPS discharge is still occurring at Fukushima Daiichi. I was impressed with how the rubble along the seaside has significantly been reduced. And, congratulations on being able to get the sample from the molten fuel. That's a complicated task. I was very impressed with the robotic system where you did a lot of practicing beforehand, and that went well.

Mr. Sakurai

I have visited Fukushima Daiichi and been shown the site several times. I understand the difficulty of trying new technologies.

However, the troubles occurring at Fukushima Daiichi are the result of basic mistakes, and I'd like you to give more effort into preventing simple mistakes.

During an opinion exchange at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa upon my last visit, it was explained to me that, " There are no errors that are not rudimentary, and there are no errors in complicated work," and I completely agree.

Executive Vice President Ono

During the question and answers earlier, it was explained that worker accidents are happening during preparations and clean up the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, and the same goes for Fukushima Daiichi. Totally eliminating work accidents is extremely difficult, and something we are having a hard time with, but it's also the case that even if there is a safety officer watching the worksite, it's still impossible to prevent all accidents. Therefore, we are deliberating how to train safety officers so that we can deploy a lot of them to the field to watch things closely.

Dr. Casto

The trip to 1F was very meaningful for me and impactful.

Executive Vice President Ono

There was something that I was personally very impressed with when Dr. Casto visited

1F. There are many uneven surfaces at 1F and when Dr. Casto was approaching such a place he would always raise his hand and say, "Watch your step!" I realized by watching him that this is something we need to do on a daily basis and I plan to talk to fieldworkers about this to get their opinion.

Mr. Sakurai

On a similar note, when visiting Kashiwazaki-Kariwa we were told to always hold onto the handrails when climbing stairs and to always put on your seatbelt when traveling by car even if for only a short distance. These are basic actions for safety, and simple, but very important actions. Safety means layering these simple behaviors.

Mr. Kobayashi

What is your goal for contaminated water reductions?

Executive Vice President Ono

We aim to get to 50 tons per day by 2028. Going forward we will continue to pave site surfaces and waterproof penetrations between buildings at Fukushima Daiichi in order to reduce the amount of contaminated water being generated. We will then deliberate whether we can reduce this amount to less than 50 tons based on the effectiveness of these countermeasures. Also, the ice wall is an active countermeasure due to its electricity requirements, so we are examining the possibility of more passive countermeasures.

Dr. Nishizawa

The pamphlets in the TEPCO Decommissioning Archives do a very good job of compiling information on ALPS-treated water to convey to overseas stakeholders. The technical aspects of the discharge of ALPS-treated water are being controlled, but I think there's still room for improvement in regards to how this information is conveyed to the public. When you compare the amount of radioactive substance discharge from Fukushima Daiichi to other nuclear power stations, you can see that the amount from Fukushima Daiichi is less by a factor of 10 or more. People can learn a lot from comparisons, so I think there's room for innovation and how information is disclosed.

Furthermore, in Document 2 (Nuclear Safety Reform Initiative Status) it only notes the

number of worker accidents and not the total volume of work (denominator), so a probabilistic/statistical assessment cannot be made. If the number of work accidents has increased in conjunction with an increase in workload, failure to note the amount of work in these documents makes them misleading.

Executive Vice President Ono

We believe there is still the room for improvement in regards to how we disclose information. Will look into this based on your suggestions.

Mr. Onishi

You are having TEPCO employees go into the field in an attempt to have them experience risky work along with front-line workers as part of our "one team" initiative, which I think is good. Having TEPCO employees understand the difficulties that contractors experience is the first step to creating "one team." I would like you to continue this initiative.

Executive Vice President Ono

It's important to have TEPCO supervisors understand where the difficulties lie with fieldwork. We will continue these attempts is that we can learn ourselves.

◆ **NRMC review results**

Secretary General Arai give report using Document 3. Results from the Monitoring of Nuclear Safety Reforms

◆ **Meeting wrap-up**

Chairman Klein

We like the one team approach because that sends the message that everyone is responsible for safety, not just TEPCO managers. I think that one team, self-responsibility for everyone is a positive sign. Training is important. Following procedures is good. And, if there are problems, you need to quickly respond so that people do not get unnecessary fears.

We may not tell the management what they would like to hear, but we'll always tell you

what we think you need to hear. We're here to help TEPCO get better.

◆ **Impressions of the Nuclear Reform Special Task Force**

Nuclear Reform Special Task Force Director Kobayakawa

I would like to thank Chairman Klein and the NRMC for their advice and guidance today pertaining to TEPCO's nuclear reform initiatives, which are based on facts acquired through their detailed and careful inspection of the worksite. Your comments today will keep us from becoming overconfident and remind us that there is no end to safety. I also understand what you have said about gaining trust by continually improving performance and remembering who we are trying to communicate with when we engage with community.

I ask for your continued guidance.

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