

The Status of Nuclear Safety Reform Initiatives

– Initiatives aimed at rooting self-directed improvements –

Our resolution:

Never forget the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident; make today safer than yesterday, and tomorrow safer than today; and become a nuclear operator that continues to create unparalleled levels of safety thereby

Contents of this report

- At the previous NRMC meeting it was recognized that, “although troubles, such as human errors, including work accidents, continue to occur, TEPCO HD has made steady progress with nuclear safety reforms.”
- This report will discuss the nuclear safety reform initiatives that have been implemented to date as well as provide an update on initiatives aimed at rooting self-directed improvements as we aim to establish sustainable systems, mechanisms, and culture [for improving safety]

Main recommendations made at the previous NRMC meeting (2025.5.27)

- Various troubles will occur when restarting a power station that has been in long-term shutdown, so when these events occur, we would like you to make conservative decisions and take care to ensure that you can respond appropriately to the issue at hand.
- It is also important to engage in continuous efforts to ensure that you can be imaginative and respond independently to new risks that may occur in the future.
- You must never forget that nuclear safety is your utmost priority
- We look forward to seeing a self-directed continuation of the nuclear safety reform initiatives you have implemented to date

Report contents

1. Primary initiatives to date reported at the last NRMC meeting
2. Initiatives aimed at rooting self-directed improvements

1. Primary initiatives to date reported on at the last NRMC meeting


<Note>

- ✓ The focus is primarily on the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa and Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Stations. Information on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station has been included in the “Decommissioning Initiatives” report.

Commencement of commercial operation of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 6

- In January of this year the Unit 6 reactor was started up and tests were performed to confirm integrity. **On April 16, we recommenced commercial operation after an approximate 14 year hiatus.**

Primary schedule leading up to the commercial operation of Unit 6



January 21 reactor startup



February 16 Commencement of power generation



April 16 Issuance of pre-operational confirmation certificate

Dealing with nonconformities during the startup of KK Unit 6

- When various nonconformities occurred, those involved gathered to discuss the problem, ascertain the cause, and **steadily move to the next step only after confirming safety**
- **The latest information and information on nonconformities is disclosed on a daily basis** in the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station information portal on the TEPCO HD website

Date	Nonconforming event	Press conference info
Jan. 17	Control rod pair rod setting error	
Jan. 19	Decision made to delay planned start up for January 19	Extraordinary press briefing: Cause investigation report
Jan. 21	Reactor startup (1 st attempt)	
Jan. 22	Minor malfunction with control rod operating monitoring system (Serious inverter malfunction) → Decision made to shut down the reactor	Extraordinary Site Superintendent Press Conference: It was explained that the reactor was shut down
Feb. 6		Extraordinary Site Superintendent Press Conference : Cause investigation report
Feb. 9	Reactor startup (2 nd attempt)	
Mar. 12	Generator sensitive ground fault relay alarm	
Mar. 13	Generator taken offline in order to perform an investigation	It was explained at the extraordinary press briefing that the reactor was taken offline
Mar. 19		Extraordinary press briefing: Cause investigation report
Mar. 22	Generator put back online	
Apr. 16	Commencement of commercial operation	

柏崎刈羽原子力発電所6号機 最新情報

電気出力約135.6万kWで運転中

※ 区分II以上の不具合発生時はこちらに掲載します

Portal (during normal times)

柏崎刈羽原子力発電所6号機 最新情報

営業運転に向けた機能試験・評価を計画停止中

※ 計画停止について (公表区分I) の詳細はこちら >

Portal (when nonconformities occur)



Portal (Visualization of startup process)

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Steering Committee (“KK Steering Committee”)

- In October 2025, the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Steering Committee (“KK Steering Committee”) was established to enable external experts from different fields to sit down with company executives and think about management of the entire power station.
- Comprised of former executives from other power companies as well as experts from within and outside of Japan, the KK Steering Committee supervises safety improvement initiatives as well as management of the entire power station, including information dissemination, with a high degree of independence and transparency.
- The KK Steering Committee has the authority to make recommendations directly to the Board of Directors and the Board of Directors shall heed those recommendations with the utmost respect

Primary topics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ① Monitoring of safety culture and company culture ② Improving trust in TEPCO amongst prefectural residents of Niigata
Activity details	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Checking the PDCA cycle for business plans • Fixed point monitoring (interviews, questionnaires) • Attending power station meetings as observers (Chairman) • Checking field/power station performance data and training status • Reviewing face-to-face communication activities • Reviewing how various forms of media are being leveraged for public relations
Meeting frequency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Once every quarter

	Name (honourifics omitted)	Career History
Chairman	Toshihide Sato	Former Site Superintendent, Higashidori Nuclear Power Station, Tohoku Power Company Inc.
External Members	Toshihiko Itami	Former Chief Public Prosecutor, Osaka High Public Prosecutors Officer
	Takehiko Ota	General Manager, Management Reforms Assistance Office, Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation
	Charles Casto	Former Senior Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
	Asako Kikuno	President, K Approach
	Yasuyoshi Kuwabara	Former Chairman, KK Transparency Community Association
	Hiromi Yamazaki	Former Senior Managing Executive Officer/Siting Environment & Plant Siting Division GM, Chubu Electric Power Company
Internal Members	Tomoaki Kobayakawa	Director, Representative Executive Officer, President, TEPCO HD
	Toshihiko Fukuda	Director, Executive Vice-President, Nuclear Power & Plant Siting Division GM, TEPCO HD
	Yukihiko Kakizawa	TEPCO HD Managing Executive Officer, Niigata Headquarters President
	Takeyuki Inagaki	TEPCO HD Managing Executive Officer, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Site Superintendent



First KK Steering Committee meeting

Funding initiatives

- **Approximately 100 billion yen in funding is being provided to Niigata Prefecture** to help vitalize the regional economy and build infrastructure that will enable residents to **live safely with peace of mind in an effort to contribute to Niigata Prefecture**. TEPCO HD is not just providing funding, but rather making an effort to coexist with the region by engaging in projects with regional government and local companies.
- **How this funding will be used (safety and preparedness measures, regional and industrial recovery, assistance for initiatives required in conjunction with the expansion of nuclear emergency planning zones)** was disclosed during the February meeting of the Niigata Prefectural assembly.

■ Examples of initiatives anticipated by TEPCO HD



Niigata Prefecture: Excerpts from the "FY2026 Budget Summary"

[How the funding will be used by Niigata Prefecture]

Over the next approximate 10 years TEPCO will provide approximately 100 billion yen in funding. This funding will be used in primarily the following ways while prioritizing safety and peace of mind in the siting community.

[Safety/preparedness measure implement]

- Improve environments for safe evacuation and cultivate peace of mind amongst the prefectural residents (Initiatives anticipated at current time)
- installation of air conditioners in indoor evacuation facilities (school gymnasiums)
- Enhance snow removal systems for ensuring six-directional evacuations
- Improve roads to ensure safety in accordance with the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness

[Regional and industrial recovery]

- Strengthen initiatives aimed at the sustainable growth and development of Niigata Prefecture in order to quell fears about the widening disparity between the prefecture and the metropolitan region, which stands to gain the most economic profit from restart. (Initiatives anticipated at current time)
- Implement initiatives that have a substantial economic impact and lead to improvements in employment and population in the prefecture

[Assistance for initiatives required in conjunction with the expansion of the emergency planning zone]

- Support for initiatives to correct disparities between regions, such as the amount of grants received for siting electric power facilities (Initiatives anticipated at current time)
- Electric bill subsidies for general households and companies in the aforementioned region
- Electric bill subsidies for companies that newly build offices in the aforementioned region

[Reference] Preparedness support: Cooperative agreement with Niigata Prefecture on nuclear preparedness

- On October 16, 2020, TEPCO signed a “Cooperative Agreement on Nuclear Preparedness” with Niigata Prefecture for the purpose of improving the effectiveness of protective measures implemented in accordance with Niigata Prefecture Wide-Area Nuclear Emergency Evacuation Plan
- In accordance with the agreement, during times of normalcy mechanisms shall be built to ensure that there are vehicles and personnel available to assist with the evacuation of residents, and continual reviews and improvements of these cooperative mechanisms shall be made through participation in nuclear preparedness training sponsored by Niigata Prefecture.

Transport of persons with special needs

If so requested by the local government, we shall transport persons with special needs living at social welfare facilities



Welfare vehicles



Training

Setting up checkpoints for people leaving evacuation zones

Operation of checkpoints for people leaving evacuation zones



Vehicle checks



Resident checks

Providing daily necessities

Provision of food and daily necessities being stored at power stations and the Head Office

Inventory	
Food	60,000 meals
Drinking water	60,000 L
Blankets	3,000

Mechanisms for contributing to evacuation
Approximately 2,500 people would be mobilized throughout the entire TEPCO Group in order to assist with the evacuation of residents from the PAZ/UPZ in the event of a nuclear disaster

Other operators will provide personnel and materials/equipment in accordance with cooperative agreements signed between nuclear operators

Provision of personal protective equipment

Radiation protection equipment will be provided to people evacuating or relocating temporarily



Emergency monitoring

Cooperation with emergency monitoring measurements
 • Portable monitoring posts
 • Monitoring cars, etc.



Participation in preparedness training sponsored by the prefecture

Improving the skills of personnel and the ability to respond


< Recent TEPCO employee participation in Niigata Prefecture nuclear preparedness training >				
FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Approx. 130 people	Approx. 150 people	Approx. 210 people*	Approx. 170 people	Approx. 120 people



* Implemented as large scale general preparedness training sponsored by the national government

Decommissioning the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station

- The decision to decommission all reactors was made on July 31, 2019 and decommissioning began on June 23, 2021
- The decommissioning process (44 years) will be broken down into four stages, and Stage 1 is already underway (dismantling preparations: 10 years)
- During preparations we will commence the dismantling of equipment located outside of controlled zones while also implementing contamination surveys of controlled zones so as to deliberate methods for disposing of waste and formulate plans for the efficient dismantling of controlled zones and the effective usage of the site after which we will smoothly transition to Stage 2.
- Revisions are being made to parts of this process, but we are proceeding as planned and there should be no impact on the 44 year time schedule



① Contamination survey			
② Removal of contamination caused by nuclear fuel material			
Dismantling and removal of equipment inside controlled zones (everything other than the reactor)			
Radiation decay of reactor (safe storage)		Dismantling and removal of reactor	Dismantling and removal of buildings
③ Dismantling and removal of equipment outside controlled zones			
④ Removal of nuclear fuel material from the spent fuel pools in the reactor buildings			
④ Transfer of nuclear fuel material			
⑤ Treatment and disposal of radioactive waste (radioactive waste from operation and radioactive waste from decommissioning)			

【Reference】 Major progress made with the decommissioning of the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station


Process stipulated in the decommissioning plan	Major progress
① Contamination Survey	<p><Objective ></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Contamination surveys will be conducted in order to formulate a work plan for “② Removal of contamination caused by nuclear fuel material,” ascertain the amount of waste that will be generated in conjunction with the dismantling and removal of equipment, and draft an appropriate disposal plan <p><Progress ></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ During FY2025, field surveys were conducted and samples of concrete were taken from the inside of the Unit 4 primary containment vessel. ■ During FY2026, the sampled specimens will be analyzed and we will start taking samples from other reactors. The adequacy of assessment results to date will also be examined in light of actual measurements taken during field surveys and reassessments conducted as necessary.
③ Dismantling and removal of equipment outside controlled zones	<p><Objective ></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Outdoor equipment that is no longer in use will be dismantled in order to secure space for heavy machinery and for work required to proceed with decommissioning <p><Progress ></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ During FY2025, the chemical solution tanks for Units 3 and 4 were dismantled. Diesel oil tanks are still being drained and will be dismantled and removed beginning in FY2026.
④ Removal of nuclear fuel material	<p><Objective ></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Spent fuel in the spent fuel pools inside the reactor buildings will be removed and relocated to a dry storage facility (to be built onsite at Fukushima Daini) in order to begin the dismantling of the reactors (Stage 3). <p><Progress ></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ The decommissioning plan modification permit application that was submitted in order to build a dry storage facility is still under review

2. Initiatives aimed at rooting self-directed improvements

- ① Improving safety awareness
- ② Improving technological capability
- ③ Improving the ability to engage in dialogue


<Note>

- ✓ The "3P's" noted on some slides refers to
 - People (skills and organization)
 - Plant (power station facilities)
 - Procedure (mechanisms/procedures)



Summary of initiatives to date

- **The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Summary and Nuclear Safety Reform Plan** was publicly announced in March 2013
- The arrogance and overconfidence in safety that existed prior to the accident were wiped clean and countermeasures were implemented to address the lack of **Safety awareness/Technological capability/Ability to engage in dialogue**, which were underlying causes of the accident
- Initiatives to enable the organization to **identify its weaknesses through self-assessments and make continuous improvements were implemented to address the expectations and key issues presented by the NRMC**



Work mechanisms for improving Nuclear safety

~Management Model~

- In 2017, a **Management Model** was created to succeed the **Nuclear Safety Reform Plan** which summarizes the regrets and lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident

The Management Model...

- ...is a document that summarizes how to engage in work so as to achieve the world's highest levels of safety and work quality
- ...clearly states what work processes are needed in order to achieve safe and efficient power station operation
- ...is a road map for understanding the actual meaning of our work and continually making *kaizen*

Vision: Keep the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident firmly in mind; we should be safer today than we were yesterday, and safer tomorrow than today; we call for nuclear power plant operators that keep creating unparalleled safety.

Mission: To achieve nuclear power generation with safety and efficiency that meet the highest international standards.


Values: Safety awareness, Technological capability, Ability to promote dialogue

Basic policy to achieve goals: Constant reforms and improvements, Promotion of work under direct management by seeing, hearing and feeling, Improve technological capability through cooperation with contractors

Management Model

Nuclear power business
Decommissioning

Reform Plan
Countermeasures
1~6



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The regrets and lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident

- Root causes of the accident (Vicious cycle)
 - TEPCO was not prepared for such an accident because it had assumed that safety had already been achieved and prioritized operating rate as a key management issue
- Nuclear safety reform initiatives
 - Efforts are being made to **improve “Safety awareness,” “Technological capability,” and the “Ability to engage in dialogue,”** which were the largest factors contributing to the vicious cycle, and continually improve nuclear safety

Root causes

In light of the fact that TEPCO boasted excellent unplanned shutdown rates and safety-critical equipment malfunction rates compared to other operators all over the world,...

- **It was assumed that safety had already been achieved**
 - **Upper management was not fulfilling its role of appropriately monitoring and supervising any lack in safety awareness in the Nuclear Power Division**
 - “Handling the scenario in the allotted amount of time” was **the only focus of emergency response training**
- **Operating rate was prioritized as a key management issue**
 - Over reliance on plant manufacturers **led to a lack of ability to oversee the company’s systems, make repairs in-house, and predict emergencies**
 - **Decay of the ability to explain risk and risk countermeasures**

Nuclear safety reforms

- **Six countermeasures** were formulated and implemented in order to address the root causes (Reform Plan 2013)
- The countermeasures are explained as follows in light of the changes that have been made to date.

Safety awareness

- Strengthening **performance monitoring on all levels** (→slides 16, 17)
- Strengthening **internal communication** (→slide 19)
- Implementation of **training to convey the facts of the accident and the lessons learned from it** (→slide 21)

Technological capability

- **Implementation of equipment safety measures** (→slide 23)
- **Strengthening the ability to handle emergencies** (→slide 24)
- **Strengthening the ability to propose defense-in-depth measures** (→slide 27)

Ability to engage in dialogue

- Strengthening **risk communication activities** (→slide 29)
- Strengthening **communication with the region** (→slide 30,31)


2. Initiatives aimed at rooting self-directed improvements

- ① Improving safety awareness
- ② Improving technological capability
- ③ Improving the ability to engage in dialogue

Mechanisms for realizing self directed improvements

-Performance monitoring-


- Through the **layer one self-assessments** and the **layer two assessments** conducted by **nuclear leaders**, the organization critically assesses itself to find weaknesses and make improvements
- While leveraging the **assessment results from layer three internal monitoring organizations**, the organization is strengthened to **enable weaknesses to be corrected before they are pointed out by third-parties**



Safety awareness① Self-assessments and assessments by Nuclear leaders



- Strengthen **corrective action programs (CAP)** that lead to corrections upon noticing things on a daily basis through field management observation (MO) and external operating experience
- Identify gaps between the world's highest levels of performance and the current situation, and continually implement **self-assessments** to make proactive and continuous improvements. Promote fast improvements without relying upon third-party reviews
- Continue to have Head Office nuclear leaders participate in power station **performance review meetings**. And, discuss important issues in the KK Steering Committee in a timely manner.

Self assessment (Layer 1)



Messages from upper management

- Improving MO skills
⇒ Field management observation & coaching (MO&C) and condition reports (CR) for strengthening operations monitoring is leveraged to enable operators to identify and monitor the signs of equipment degradation as the transition is made from long term shutdown to stable operation
- CR trend analysis
⇒ Classification codes used for analysis will be consolidated or deleted, etc. to optimize use from a user perspective in conjunction with the actual state of the company in order to strengthen the process for easily differentiating the location of a problem and the cause.



Assessments by Nuclear leaders (Layer 2)

- The status of in-house initiatives will be regularly reported to everyone from the President down and upper management shall perform reviews. Leadership shall supervise PDCA activities.

Safety awareness② Internal external/oversight functions

- Comprised of engineers (including licensed reactor engineers residing at the power stations) with expertise in each field, **the Nuclear Safety Oversight Office (NSOO)** assesses and monitors the safety of power stations from a position independent of the Nuclear Power Division.
- Third-party (WANO, JANSI, IAEA, etc.)** reviews are not required by regulatory authorities but rather received by the Head Office and each power station for the purpose of promoting corrective action for issues that are pointed out at each location

Assessment by the Nuclear Safety Oversight Office (Layer 3)

- NSOO was established in May 2013 under the direct supervision of the Board of Directors. Reorganized in 2015 to be under the direct supervision of the President.
- Field performance at each site is quantitatively assessed quarterly using 12 categories. Monitoring results and advice are provided to executives while also reporting to the Board of Directors
- As an independent in-house organization, assessments are conducted from an objective point of view and self-directed improvements by the Nuclear Power Division are encouraged in an effort to improve performance



(Field observation by the NSOO)

Assessments by upper management (Layer 4)

- KK Steering Committee (Refer to slide 5 for details) etc.

Third-party assessments (Layer 5)

Private sector cooperation World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO)
[1989~]
Japan Nuclear Safety Institute (JANSI)
[2012~]


Government cooperation International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
[1957~]



(WANO review)

【Reference】 Nuclear business governments and oversight structure (big picture)

- External committees comprised of experts from within and outside of Japan, and dedicated in-house departments under the supervision of the President have been established in order to strengthen governance and oversight. A KK Steering Committee that reports to the Board of Directors has been newly established in order to further strengthen governance at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Power (Layers 3 and 4)
- Third-party reviews by WANO, JANSI, etc. are welcomed to pursue excellence (Layer 5)



● Departments related to Nuclear safety
 ● Departments related to Nuclear security
 ※ Excludes departments related to compliance




Safety awareness③

Internal communication and “One Team”

- More than 6,000 TEPCO employees and contractors are engaged at work at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station, approximately 80% of which live in Niigata Prefecture.
- In order to cultivate company and safety culture, workers are encouraged to **greet one another**, and joint **review meetings of accidents** are held. In the event of a human error or accident everyone works as **“One Team”** to make improvements.



Encouraging workers to greet one another



Joint review meetings of field accidents



ONE TEAM posters



Participation in contractor morning meetings



Site Superintendent's blog



Thank you cards and stickers

【Reference】 Relocating required Head Office functions to the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station

- A new Kashiwazaki branch of the Head Office (tentative name) is being built on the former site of Kashiwazaki Energy Hall so as to relocate Head Office functions close to the site thereby enabling the **Head Office Nuclear Power Division to manage the power station in concert with field workers** (Planned completion date: During 2027)
- Furthermore, increasing opportunities to directly hear the opinions of regional residents will enable those opinions and concerns to be taken into consideration in the course of performing Head Office duties and managing the power station as we aim to **become a power station trusted by the community**

<Relocation plan >

item	Year	November 2021	May 2022	~FY2027
Number of personnel relocated (total)		16	64	Approx. 300
Office location		Within the power station	Within the power station, administration building (UK building)	Within the power station, administration building (near Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Station)
Relocated functions		Reform promotion, project analysis, cost analysis, training, et	Quality and safety, schedule management, equipment diagnostics, etc.	Design-related functions (pertaining to future construction at the power station)

<Concept photo>



<Building layout concept> concept *A machinery room will be built on the 5th floor

4F Offices

3F Offices

2F Used for training

Will be available for use as an Emergency Response Center in the event of a disaster

1F Used for regional coexistence facilities

The space on the first floor of Kashiwazaki Energy Hall will be open for use by regional residents

Safety awareness④ Conveying the facts about, and lessons learned from, the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident

Procedure

■ As the operator responsible for the accident, we are subjecting all employees, not just those in the Nuclear Power Division or upper management, to training that provides them with the facts of the accident and the lessons we learned from it in order to fulfill our responsibilities to Fukushima and build safety culture

● Implementation of training for all employees to learn about the facts and lessons learned from the nuclear accident (July 2018~)

- ✓ Training objectives
 - To be able to express the facts and lessons learned from the accident in one's own words
 - To promise to each other to fulfill our responsibilities to Fukushima
- ✓ Training content
 - Correct explanations based on fact, sit-down circle discussions to pass down experience and promote awareness of abnormalities, action declarations




● Training facility and program

- ✓ The facility was newly renovated in October 2020 and now offers much more information. In conjunction with this, information has been systematically arranged and videos are leveraged in order to create easy-to-understand displays
- ✓ 1st round (July 2018~September 2020): 27,800 participants, 2nd round (April 2021~April 2022): 26,793 participants. For round three, which commenced in February 2023, a revised program based on the four elements of safety culture and a three-layered model is being utilized to enable participants to internalize the accident and pursue mental safety (Number of participants as of the end of March 2026: 18, 296)

● Future plans

- ✓ Promote a transition to training that enables each participant to notice things and take action during the course of their own duties to prevent the fruits of training from being forgotten
- ✓ Regularly engaging in the PDCA cycle after organically linking it to e-learning programs held during 3.11 company events
- ✓ Some facility information is being updated and focus points are being identified in preparation for the 4th round of training



2. Initiatives aimed at rooting self-directed improvements

- ① Improving safety awareness
- ② Improving technological capability
- ③ Improving the ability to engage in dialogue

- The lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident has been reflected in safety measures such as **tsunami countermeasures, power source enhancements, cooling function enhancements, and measures to prevent the dispersion of radioactive substances**
- We will continue to independently pursue safety without being satisfied with just adhering to regulatory requirements

〈 Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station safety measures (primary facilities) 〉


Tsunami countermeasures and power source enhancements



[Seawall]

- 15m high to protect against a tsunami run-up height of 7.6 meters※
- ※Assessment based on the design basis tsunami


Cooling function enhancements



[High Pressure Alternate Cooling System]

- Design began prior to issuance of the new regulatory requirements

Preventing the dispersion of radioactive substances



[Filter vents]

- Developed in-house
- Reduces particulate radioactive substances to less than 1/1000th

[Recirculation cooling system system]

- Independently developed new heat removal system
- **New regulations that set a new norm**
- The discharge of radioactive substances can be prevented for **approximately 10 days**

Technological capability ② Strengthening the ability to respond to emergencies

- Training is continually repeated under various scenarios in light of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident
- Since the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, **general training has been held more than 190 times** for emergency response departments at the power stations, and **individual training sessions in the field have been implemented more than 34,000 times**



General training



Training on connecting substitute heat exchangers



Training on laying power cables



Operations instructions in the main control room



Field patrol inspection guidance



Simulator training

【Reference】 Strengthening the ability to respond to emergencies

- **Emergency response teams and how they operate have been revised** in light of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident
- **Training under various scenarios that require difficult decision-making is repeated on a daily basis**
- **TEPCO employees are given the ability to respond to emergencies in the field themselves** without having to be dependent upon external assistance, such as from contractors

Primary initiatives for strengthening the ability to respond to emergencies

	Lessons learned from the accident	Safety measures
Department	Almost all decisions made by the Site Superintendent	Site Superintendent focuses on making the most serious decisions (Decision-making authority granted to managers underneath the Site Superintendent)
	Confusion caused by external inquiries and instructions	In principle, the Head Office handles all external parties. It has also been clarified that the Head Office is to support and assist the power station
Training	Superficial training that didn't include severe accident scenarios <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scenarios conveyed in advance • General training conducted once a year 	Training under various scenarios that require difficult decision-making is repeatedly implemented <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scenarios not disclosed (blind) • Scenarios consider simultaneous disasters at multiple sites • General training: 192 times*(once a month) • Individual training: 34,132 times*
Field response	Lack of employees with the skills required to handle an accident	Employees in the field now have the ability to initially respond to an accident by themselves <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reactor coolant injection • Securing power from generator trucks, etc. • Removing rubble from access routes, etc.

※KK statistics for 2013~2025Q3

Restructuring of emergency response structure (power station)






Photo of emergency response teams after introduction of the ICS (Command Center Director, supervisors and managers)

Technological capability③ : Strengthening the ability to propose defense-in-depth measures

- Competition held to strengthen the ability to propose safety improvements in order to “accumulate” defense-in-depth initiatives
- Ideas for improving safety are continuously elicited and the best ideas are quickly implemented

< Examples of ideas put into use at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station >



(Note: No proposals were asked for in 2022 because kaizen ideas that contribute to reducing nuclear safety were chosen as the best ideas)

① Deployment of maintenance vehicles for safety measure equipment

If safety equipment breaks down during an emergency and requires repairs, it takes time to gather the tools and equipment necessary to make such repairs thereby possibly preventing a quick field response. So, maintenance vehicles loaded with all the tools and supplies necessary have been deployed and are ready to go.



② Plant announcements during scram

If the Site Superintendent is required to page individuals about field evacuation orders in the event of a disaster while also having to deal with the emergency at hand, there is a possibility that such notification may be delayed or that discrepancies arise in the content and frequency of such instructions as they are relayed. Therefore, an emergency announcement that can be played automatically by the push of a button has been created.

Unit 1 MCR



Unit 2 MCR



2. Initiatives aimed at rooting self-directed improvements

- ① Improving safety awareness
- ② Improving technological capability
- ③ Improving the ability to engage in dialogue

Ability to engage in dialogue ①

Transitioning from “conveying” to “conveying information that is easily understood”

Risk communication and the dissemination of information

- Nuclear leaders are engaging in risk communication activities to gain the understanding of the siting community and society under the idea that there is no absolute to nuclear safety (zero risk)
- Experts in close positions to upper management and nuclear power executives referred to as **risk communicators** have been assigned to the Head Office and each power station. They offer advice and suggestions to parties throughout the company in regards to how to create presentation materials that are easy to understand and engage in dialogue with community residents.

【Regular Site Superintendent’s press conference】



Once a month the Site Superintendent and risk communicators give the most updated information on the power station to the media
 ※ The press conferences are also live streamed on the company’s website

【Committee on Ensuring Transparency at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station】



Once a month the Site Superintendent and risk communicators give the most update information on the power station to representatives of the siting community

Ability to engage in dialogue ②

Transitioning from “conveying” to “conveying information that is easily understood”

Communicating with people in the region

- At TEPCO communication booths set up throughout Niigata Prefecture, questions and concerns about power station safety measures are carefully addressed
- The influence of SNS platforms has greatly increased over the last few years with the spread of smartphones, etc. In light of these changes to the environment, we are putting more effort into newspaper advertisements, radio commercials, online advertisements, and SNS, etc. as well as **running TV commercials and transportation advertisements (bus stop advertisements and train station signage, etc.) in Niigata Prefecture and the Tokyo metropolitan area**
- We will continue to strive to **carefully disseminate easy-to-understand information on power station safety measures initiatives and preparedness measures**

< TEPCO Communication Booths >



- Booths have been set up 212 times since 2015 and have been visited by 51,272 people (as of June 15, 2026)
- Booths were set up 33 times during FY2025 and were visited by 11,470 people
- The opinions elicited at communication booths are provided as feedback to the Power Station and leveraged in Power Station management

Public relations activities that leverage various forms of media >



Transportation advertisements

(Bus stop advertisements and train station signage, etc.)



SNS/Advertisements in online videos



普通の毎日は、みんなで作る。

TV commercials in Niigata Prefecture and the Tokyo metropolitan area

- During FY2025 we implemented public relations measures that leveraged various types of media, such as TV commercials in Niigata Prefecture and the Tokyo Metropolitan area, as well as transportation advertisements, such as bus advertisements and train station signage

Transitioning from “conveying” to “conveying information that is easily understood”

- Participants are given tours of the site from the comfort of a bus from which they can see the actual facilities and hear about safety measures
- In FY2025 approximately 8,700 people visited the site, making the total number of visitors since 2011 approximately 141,000
- Furthermore, as TEPCO employees, each site worker participates in various “**regional coexistence activities,**” which include such things as participation in regional events and clean up activities.



Power station bus tour flier



Beach cleanup the day following the Kashiwazaki Fireworks Festival



Coastal sand removal



Power station bus tour



Gion Kashiwazaki Festival folk dance parade



Kariwa Hometown Festival “Obon Dance”

Conclusion: Our resolution

- In accordance with the Management Model, which passes down the regrets and lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident, we will **continue to improve nuclear safety** through continuous improvements to safety awareness, technological capability, and the ability to engage in dialogue
- With the understanding that there is **no end to safety or self-directed improvements**, in addition to **internal oversight** by the NSOO, we will **proactively cooperate with third-party reviews** by WANO, the IAEA and JANSI, etc., and **heed the advice of these parties**, as well as the KK Steering Committee, **to continuously make improvements**

Our resolution:

Never forget the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident; make today safer than yesterday, and tomorrow safer than today; and become a nuclear operator that continues to create unparalleled levels of safety thereby